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Is the city the appropriate scale 
for participatory democracy? 






The city used to have a prominent place in political theory, but as the nation-state be-
came the dominant political form in the 18th century, the city largely disappeared from 
political philosophy (Dahl and Tufte 1973, chapter 1). Nevertheless, the city lingered on 
in democratic theory, especially among thinkers who criticized representative govern-
ment and maintained that some kind of participatory politics should be put in its place. 
Two of the most outspoken bearers of this tradition are Murray Bookchin and Benjamin 
Barber. They see the city as a potential realm of the citizens’ collective management 
through face-to-face assemblies (Bookchin 1995), and as a natural venue for citizen 
participation (Barber 2013). Even Robert Dahl, considered by some the father of mod-
ern political science, argues that the medium-sized city is the optimal unit for democra-
cy: it is both big enough to deal with the most vital aspects of our environment, yet at 
the same time small enough for citizens to participate extensively in determining the 
ways in which power should be used (Dahl 1967; Dahl 1990, 126-135). 
      City-democrats like these do not present empirical theories that can be tested 
through observation and experiment. They make normative claims of what democracy 
should be like. Nonetheless, their claims are based on assumptions of the viability and 
achievability of the alternatives they present, which in turn are informed by empirical 
cases (Wright 2010, 21-25). Some of the historical examples they use include classical 
Athens, city republics in medieval Italy, or rebellious cities like Paris during the Great 
French Revolution. The contemporary case probably most used to support the city dem-
ocratic view, is participatory budgeting in Brazil (Pateman 2012). There, municipalities 
have given citizens the opportunity to decide the budget through an open, participatory 
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process. Archon Fung has written that the significance of participatory budgeting for the 
theory of participatory democracy is akin to the discovery of the quark in theoretical 
physics (Fung 2011, 859). 
      One way to think of such empirical examples is that they constitute one of many 
building blocks or ‘provisional fixed points’ of normative theories. Both these points 
and the general theory itself are open to continual revisions, and if the points are incom-
patible with the general normative theory, we might consider either revising the fixed 
point or the theory, or vice versa (Thacher 2006, 1647-1648). I doubt that any city dem-
ocrats would discard their view if participatory budgeting in Brazil did not turn out to be 
as good as many think, but it could spark revisions of their theories. The fixed point that 
I will discuss in this article is the assumption that the city is a more appropriate scale for 
participatory democracy than higher levels of government. Barber relates this directly to 
participatory budgeting. He writes that participatory budgeting cannot prove that urban 
government is more capable of ‘strong democracy’ than the state, but it at least “offers 
hope for those who believe there may be a little less distance between mayors and citi-
zens than between voters and state authorities” (Barber 2013, 308). I ask whether the 
experience of participatory budgeting in Brazil warrants this hope. Does participatory 
budgeting work better at the city level than at larger scales? And what does this tell us 
about the assumption that the city is the appropriate scale for participatory democracy? 
      In this article I compare participatory budgeting in the city of Porto Alegre (a city 
with about 1.5 million inhabitants) and the state of Rio Grande do Sul in southern Brazil 
(a state with about 11.2 million inhabitants). This limits the scope of the answer. I do 
not, for example, compare participatory processes at the municipal and the federal level. 
I also eschew comparisons such as those between the city and the countryside, between 
cities of different sizes, or of the type of conditions that promote or impede participatory 
processes at different levels. These are undoubtedly important for a broader evaluation 
of the city as a site for participatory democracy, but are not the focus here. Notwith-
standing these limitations, the comparison in this study provides a partial but interesting 
answer. Even though the practice of participatory budgeting more closely resembles 
ideals of participatory democracy at the city level, it does not mean that participatory 
democracy is impossible at larger scales. On the contrary, the difference between partic-
ipatory budgeting at the city and state level is more a question of grades than leaps in 
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terms of democratic qualities. Furthermore, some of the features that are considered 
unique to the city – neighborhood-based community associations that mobilize and dis-
cuss with citizens in local public spheres – are also important in participatory budgeting 
at the state level. The experiences of participatory budgeting at the city and state level in 
Brazil suggests that it is both wrong to overemphasize the uniqueness of the city as well 
as to downplay the possibility that it might play a special role in both local and larger 
participatory processes. 
 
Participatory democracy and the city 
There exists a diversity of versions of ‘participatory democracy’ (see for example 
Pateman 1970; Mansbridge 1983; Bachrach and Botwinick 1992; della Porta 2013). 
Most define it as a type of organization (here a form of government) that is based on the 
direct participation in decision-making processes by those that are affected by such de-
cisions. These processes have to possess real decision-making powers, and empower 
previously excluded and marginalized groups. A participatory democracy does not ex-
clude the election of some individuals to perform certain tasks or take certain decisions, 
but it shifts the authority in the organization from the representative organs to the partic-
ipatory channels. 
      Barber, Bookchin and Dahl have different takes on participatory democracy and the 
city, but share the view that proximity between residents and between residents and their 
government makes the city suited for a participatory form of government. Bookchin 
emphasizes, for example, that face-to-face encounters in the local communities of a city 
are the foundation for forums where common affairs can be discussed and decided upon 
among neighbors. Such forums are potentially open to all adult community members 
(Biehl 1998; Bookchin 2015; Bookchin 1995). The city is a public association. It favors 
public spaces and a vision of the city as a public common, and as such also a democratic 
culture derived from the close yet impersonal and free city life (Barber 2013, 68-71). 
Moreover, the relationship between citizens and the city government is more direct than 
with central governments. Whereas the government of the nation-state normally unfolds 
at a distance, the city administration regularly appears in the spaces where citizens con-
vene (Barber 2013, 93). Although cities require experts and administration to solve their 
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problems, these problems are fairly comprehensible to the average citizen (Dahl 1967, 
967). 
      The state – both at the national/federal and the state/provincial level – is seen by 
city-democrats as too big to allow for extensive participation. Whenever the number of 
citizens grows large they must resort to representation. This eliminates the possibility 
that every citizen can engage in a discussion with the authorities. The channels of com-
munication from the citizen to the top political leaders are long and indirect, and com-
munication is asymmetrical. A leader of a state can speak directly to millions of voters, 
but only a tiny fraction can ever speak directly back (Dahl 1967, 957). The centraliza-
tion of power creates a dynamic whereby citizens and communities are separated 
(Barber 1984, 248-249) and by which local public spheres are contained, controlled and 
manipulated by elites that are afraid to see their authority undermined (Bookchin 1995, 
221). Instead of being active participants in politics, citizens become followers of lead-
ers in representative institutions (Barber 1984, 224). That is why Barber does not as-
cribe much hope to attempts to democratize them. “On the whole,” he writes, “attempts 
at democratization within the confines of thin democracy work only to further polarize 
elites and masses while cloaking oligarchic manipulation in a mantle of popular sover-
eignty” (Barber 1984, 206). 
 
An idealized image? 
A number of criticisms can be levelled against this view. One is that the city-democrats 
present an idealized image of the city; one not rooted in how cities actually work. Mur-
ray Low (2004), for example, argues that cities are far more complex than suggested 
above. Urban dwellers do not primarily interact with each other in neighborhoods, but 
in multiple settings that are not necessarily tied to the local community. Nor do they talk 
directly to each other or with the city government. Rather, their communication is most-
ly mediated by an array of technologies, institutions and organizations (2004, 133). 
Moreover, city inhabitants don’t have uniform knowledge of the city’s issues and its 
political affairs. Instead they have a lot of knowledge about some areas and very little 
about others, which means that their political competence varies. Barnett (2014) echoes 
this view and argues that the ideal of participatory democracy is not tied to a specific 
location. Sometimes the principle that everyone who is affected by a decision should 
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have a say in it, leads groups of citizens to recognize themselves as affected by common 
urban issues, become organized through local public forums and to work directly with 
the city government in ways that are participatory and democratic. At other times, how-
ever, this principle might lead them to identify with citizens from other cities, become 
organized through representatives that build networks across cities, and to indirectly 
link up with governments and other institutions at a variety of scales. For Low it is not 
only wrong, but also dangerous, to view the city as a unique place for participatory de-
mocracy. It might lead us to overlook the potential for democratization in other settings, 
or even worse to underestimate the possibilities of democratizing governments and so-
cial relations at a larger scale (2004, 137). 
      The city-democrats concede that they present the image of an ideal city, but not that 
it is an idealized image of contemporary cities. Both Bookchin and Dahl use words such 
as ‘non-city’ or ‘anti-city’ to describe the modern megalopolis. They are more con-
cerned with the democratic possibilities in the city, as opposed to those in state institu-
tions at larger scales. But in order to realize this potential, the city’s institutions and 
social life have to be reorganized and sometimes refashioned. Ultimately this is seen as 
part of a broader social transformation that deals with several structural impediments 
such as uncontrolled urban growth, the subversion of local autonomy by the state, en-
trenched political and economic elites and persistent social inequalities (Dahl 1990, 89-
96; Bookchin 1995; Barber 2013, chapter 7-9; Barber 1984, 251-260). This is why 
Bookchin and Barber argue that participatory democracy is best suited to smaller cities, 
and that today’s megacities have the same problems as nation-states. Dahl places the 
number of inhabitants in an ideal democratic city as somewhere between 50,000 and 
200,000. This does not mean that participatory democracy has to be postponed until all 
cities are of this size. In large metropolises, for example, this ideal can be pursued by 
breaking it up into smaller administrative units. Political decentralization can open up 
democratic spaces at the neighborhood level while physical decentralization processes 
continue (Dahl 1967, 968-969; Bookchin 1995, chapter 8 and appendix). Nor do the 
city-democrats renounce political institutions at larger scales, but want to see them or-
ganized differently. Both Bookchin and Barber concede that this requires the election of 
representatives or ‘delegates,’ but they simultaneously believe that local participatory 
organs can sufficiently instruct and control these representatives and prevent them from 
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ending up as self-serving elites (Bookchin 1995, appendix; Barber 1984, 248; Barber 
2013, chapter 11) .  
 
Participatory budgeting in the city and the state 
It is not only Barber who sees participatory budgeting in Brazil – and especially in Porto 
Alegre – as an inspiring example of participatory democracy. It has a high-standing on 
the international Left, and been supported by development institutions such as the 
World Bank and the UN Development Program (Goldfrank 2012). Over the last dec-
ades, it has spread to more than a thousand cities worldwide – including places like 
New York, Paris and even municipalities in Scandinavia (Gilman 2016; Sintomer et al. 
2016; Dias 2014). Although the ideal of participatory democracy is less visible in the 
various adaptations of participatory budgeting outside of Brazil, it was at the heart of 
the project when it was first initiated in Porto Alegre in 1989. The left-wing alliance led 
by the Workers’ Party (PT) that won the elections in the city in 1988, saw it as a first 
step toward a socialist society based on an assembly- and council-structure emanating 
from the neighborhoods. One of the main aims was to break down the clientelism and 
corruption that had previously dominated the political life of the city, another was to 
direct public investments to the poorer city districts (Abers 2000, chapter 2-3; Baiocchi 
2005, chapter 2). 
      The system has undergone various phases in Porto Alegre – from an early trial and 
error phase, to a period of stable growth with increasing popular support and improved 
administrative capacity, to a phase with a shrinking budget, reduced political support 
and increased debt problems (from around 2002-to date) (Abers 2000; Goldfrank 2011, 
chapter 5; Junge 2012; Chavez 2008). Yet the basic structure of the process has re-
mained intact since the early 1990s. The money for the participatory budget is taken 
from the city’s investment funds and is used to initiate new projects or services that 
range from connecting neighborhoods to the water network, paving roads, improving 
the sewer system, renovating schools, or establishing health clinics, computer labs and 
kindergartens etc. Secondly, the process has elements of both direct participation and 
representation. It begins in open assemblies in the city districts where residents can pro-
pose what kind of projects or services the budget should fund. Here, the participants 
also cast votes on which investment areas they want to prioritize, and they elect individ-
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uals to represent them at the city level. A similar process based on the thematic areas of 
the budget – such as education, infrastructure, transportation and health – also takes 
place. The task of the elected delegates is to knit together the proposals of the district 
and thematic assemblies, and to appoint the members of a budget council that write an 
investment proposition for the city in conjunction with the mayor’s administration, 
based on the proposals and priorities decided through the participatory process. At the 
end of the budget cycle, the result of this work is delivered to the municipal legislative 
assembly which either alters the proposition or accepts it as it is. 
      Participatory budgeting has been adopted by hundreds of municipalities in Brazil 
(Avritzer and Vaz 2014; Fedozzi and Lima 2014). Still Porto Alegre is considered as 
one of the most successful examples of participatory budgeting, and the case that, at 
least in its stable growth phase, has been closest to the ideals of participatory democra-
cy.24 Research finds that municipal autonomy and decentralization of fiscal authority 
(Goldfrank 2011), the willingness of the mayor’s administration to delegate decision-
making powers to the citizens (Wampler 2007) and civil society organizations that both 
cooperate and contest with the municipality (Baiocchi et al. 2011), are particularly fa-
vorable conditions for a participatory democratic budget process in the city. However, 
as Junge points out, Porto Alegre is far from a fully realized participatory democracy. 
Only a small percentage of citizens attend meetings — usually somewhere between 2-7 
per cent of the total population. Many just show up at an assembly to vote, or even be-
cause they were told to do so by a community organization or municipal representative. 
They do not engage in sustained discussions, monitoring and mobilization over time. 
Participatory budgeting is also highly dependent on the goodwill of the mayor, who has 
a disproportionate power over the content of the process (Junge 2012, 421). 
      Participatory budgeting has also been adopted at the state level. In total five states 
have had a form of participatory budgeting.25 No other state has gone as far in imple-
                                                
24 For comparisons of Porto Alegre with other Brazilian municipalities with participatory budg-
eting, see for example Wampler (2007); Baiocchi et al. (2011); Avritzer (2009); Marquetti et al. 
(2008) and Cabannes (2004). 
25 These are Mato Grosso do Sul (Bittar 2003), Rio de Janeiro (Peci 2000), Minas Gerais 
(Corrêa 2008), Paraíba (Cezário 2013) and Rio Grande do Sul. The share of states that have 
practiced participatory budgeting has actually been higher than that of municipalities. 2.8 per 
cent of all municipal governments (or government periods) since the early 1990s has done par-
ticipatory budgeting, whereas the share is 4.9 per cent at the state level. I made this estimate by 
adding up the total number of municipal government periods from 1989-2002 based on the cur-
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menting it as Rio Grande do Sul. In 1999 the Workers’ Party entered the government 
and initiated a process that aimed to create spaces where citizens could plan and decide 
on the budget, and to redistribute public funds to the poorest sectors of the population 
(Frente Popular 1998). All state investments were included in the participatory budget, 
but it was highly disputed and the government was forced to alter the organization of it 
due to pressures from the opposition (Goldfrank and Schneider 2006). It has continued 
to exist in the state since 1999, but in general right-wing governments have given the 
participatory budget a minor role in decisions over the state’s investments. In 2011-
2014 the Workers’ Party regained power and tried to reinvigorate the process, but it 
only gave population the power to decide over about 10 per cent of the total invest-
ments.26 The research on this process is less extensive than on Porto Alegre. However, 
Goldfrank and Schneider (2002) write that the existence and relative success of partici-
patory budgeting at the state level challenges the assumption that participatory democ-
racy is unworkable at large scales, although the regularity and the quality of participa-
tion seems to have been affected when moving from the city to the state level. Faria 
(2005) is concerned with how scale shifts power in the process from regular participants 
to representative forums, and that the bureaucracy is better organized and has a greater 
say in the process at the state level. 
 
Comparing ‘best cases’ at the city and state level 
I take this analysis a step further by adding data from the state participatory budget in 
Rio Grande do Sul 2011-2014. This data is from field-work I did in 2014, which con-
sisted of interviews with government officials, organizers, participants and other central 
actors (49 interviews), observations of assemblies at the regional and local level (7 as-
                                                                                                                                          
rent number of municipalities in Brazil. For the number of government periods with participa-
tory budgeting I used (Fedozzi and Lima 2014, 158) which give a total of number of 796 such 
periods. Some of these probably include participatory budgets that were started late or aborted, 
but that’s also the case for the state level. The five states with participatory budgeting gives a 
total of 8 government periods from 1991-2014. I give Rio Grande do Sul four government peri-
ods with participatory budgeting. In addition to the state participatory budget from 1999-2002, I 
include all subsequent government periods since they involved a ‘Consulta Popular’ based on 
open municipal assemblies. This is a positive estimate since all of the state government periods 
would not fall into a strict definition of participatory budgeting. However, since there are good 
reasons to think that a large portion of the municipalities also would fall short of this definition, 
I believe this is a good comparison.  
26 Source: Transparência RS (www.transparencia.rs.gov.br). 
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semblies), and a survey of delegates in a strategic selection of six of the state’s 28 mac-
ro-regions (chosen to represent the demographic, economic, social and political diversi-
ty in the state). My description of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre is based on 
secondary sources,27 but I also analyze raw survey data on delegates from 2003 and 
2009. The description of the first period of the state participatory budget is also based 
on secondary sources.28 These secondary data highlight the development of the partici-
patory budget over time, and give me an opportunity to compare the different levels. 
When using the secondary data, I have tried to be aware of possible bias, both positive 
and negative. 
      I compare what are considered the ‘best cases’ of participatory budgeting at the city 
and state level. The ideal here would be if these were also the most similar cases, in the 
sense that they were equal on all variables except for their scale (George and Bennett 
2005, chapter 8; Levy 2008, 10-11). But they are not. The main similarities are that they 
were implemented and sustained by an alliance of a political party and social move-
ments with commitments to participatory democracy and redistribution of public re-
sources and that they are based on a similar organizational model. The main difference 
is that this alliance in Porto Alegre had more than 15 years to develop the process be-
fore the right-wing took over, whereas the state participatory budget had a shorter and 
more turbulent history of shifting governments and a contracting and expanding pro-
cess. This study is based on both qualitative and quantitative data. I use this multi-
method approach to be able to paint a more integrated picture of the participatory pro-
cess, as opposed to only using one method. One weakness is that I have only surveyed 
delegates, and not regular participants in 2014. Since this comparison is about participa-
tory democracy, I should ideally have data on the profile and opinions of both partici-
pants and delegates for all periods and at both levels. But despite these limitations, I 




                                                
27 Especially the in-depth accounts and discussions in Baiocchi (2005); Abers (2000); Gret and 
Sintomer (2005); Avritzer (2009); Goldfrank (2011); Wampler (2007). 
28 These are Goldfrank and Schneider (2002); Goldfrank and Schneider (2006); Sobottka and 
Streck (2014); Goldfrank (2014); Streck et al. (2005); Faria (2005); (César 2004). 
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Institutional design, representation and space for deliberation 
City democrats claim the space for participation is smaller at the state than the city lev-
el, and that engagement will be more indirect and representative. My comparison sup-
ports this contention. Whereas the budget cycle in Porto Alegre is based on two rounds 
of open assemblies in the city’s districts, the state participatory budget includes only 
one assembly meeting in each municipality. In the first round of assemblies in Porto 
Alegre the city administration presents the results of the previous year’s budget, shows 
the available resources of the current year and answers critical questions from the audi-
ence. This kicks off an important phase of discussion and organization that goes on in 
the local communities until the next round of assemblies. In the second round of assem-
blies the investment proposals are made, budget priorities are voted on and delegates 
elected. 
      In the state participatory budget both these rounds take place within a time-frame of 
two to three hours in one meeting. Consequently, the space for discussion and critical 
questions is diminished. Another feature that used to be central to the participatory 
budget in Porto Alegre was thematic assemblies. These were meetings that took place 
on a city-wide basis where spending within the different sectors of the municipality was 
discussed. Nothing of this sort has been attempted at the state level. All in all, the state 
participatory budget has been characterized by a stripped-down model where the spaces 
of direct participation and deliberation are fewer. 
      Is this related to differences in scale? Both yes and no. Partly it is a question of re-
sources. If the state government had enough personnel to travel around and encourage 
people to come to the meetings, it would probably be able to hold the same number of 
assemblies in each municipality as in Porto Alegre. But the state of Rio Grande do Sul 
does not have these resources. The process, however, does not only depend on logistical 
assistance, but also on the political legitimacy of the municipalities to implement the 
process at the local level. This is a question of scale. Rio Grande do Sul has nearly five 
hundred municipalities, many of which are small and dominated by politicians who do 
not favor participatory democracy. It is not realistic, therefore, to ask the municipalities 
to hold several rounds of assemblies. As one of the state organizers emphasized, a lot of 
convincing and negotiation have to take place in order for many municipalities to even 
host a single meeting: 




Even though [the state participatory budget] has been a tradition in Rio Grande 
do Sul for a long time, there are still places where local participation is small 
and timid […]. Some mayors don’t want to get involved in the process. If it was 
up to them it wouldn’t take place. If they don’t want to do it, we have to mobi-
lize the community to force the municipality to get involved. But then the par-
ticipatory process will be bad – if the municipal administration doesn’t partici-
pate it will be very bad. So then the mayor says “ok, let’s do it.” Before we have 
to use our authority to ask other public sectors to get involved in the process, 
[the mayor and the municipal administration] normally come around to do it in 
partnership with us. But if it depended on their initiative, it wouldn’t happen.29  
 
This simplified model also means that the most important deliberation regarding the 
details of the budget is done by elected delegates. In the state-wide process from 1999-
2002 this was especially the case as a state budget council was selected that wrote up, 
fairly autonomously, the final budget proposal. As Claudia Faria points out, the regular 
participants showing up at local assemblies in the state budgeting process are ‘weak 
publics’ compared to the ‘strong publics’ of the delegates where the elaboration of the 
budget takes place (Faria 2005, 204-206).  
      But this does not only happen at the state level. Also in Porto Alegre the delegates 
do most of the discussion, whereas the majority of participants only vote (Célérier and 
Botey 2015). However, at the local level there are opportunities for participants to con-
trol the delegates. First, the delegates live in the same neighborhood as the other partici-
pants. This makes it possible to bring up budget issues in everyday conversations. Se-
cond, meetings are held where delegates report back to the community on the workings 
of the budget process and the status of the local demands. Finally, neighborhood associ-
ations also rotate on who they elect as delegates, to prevent individuals from developing 
personal agendas and particular interests that are at odds with those who elected them 
(Baiocchi 2005, chapter 4; Wampler 2007, 77).  
 
                                                
29 Interview with “Rafael”, Coordinator in the Office for Citizen Participation in the Department 
of Planning, Administration and Citizen Participation (Seplag) in the state government, 
28.01.2014 
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As Avritzer (2006) emphasizes, these practices are rooted in pre-existing participatory 
community traditions that are transmitted into the official public sphere. But is this only 
possible in the city? In general, there are three types of delegates in the state participa-
tory budget. One is the mayor, local politician or municipal official. These delegates 
normally mobilize people from local communities and associations to come to the 
budget meetings, but do not respond to them. Next is the employee of a state institution 
like a school, hospital, fire brigade or police department. These delegates report back to 
the institutions and sometimes also to the users of the services they provide, such as 
pupils or patients. The last is the representative of a local community, a neighborhood 
association, social movement or NGO. These more frequently follow the same proce-
dures as in Porto Alegre. One example is the Union of Resident Associations (UAM-
CA) in Canoas, which is involved in both the municipal and the state participatory 
budget. As explained by one of UAMCAs leaders, who is also the leader of a neighbor-
hood association, the mobilization and contact with local residents is interchangeable in 
the municipal and state participatory budget: 
 
We use online social networks, we call people on their phone, we are in touch 
with the president of the local associations and if it’s needed we call a common 
meeting and then proceed to the communities. I have meetings with people in my 
community, for example, every first and third Saturday of the month, every 
month. So if we discuss something in the leadership we take it to the people in the 
community, because if not they would not be aware of it.30 
 
Participation levels, type of participants and patterns of mobilization 
Considering these reduced opportunities to take part in formulating the policies at the 
state level, one would expect that the participation rate would be lower at the state than 
at the municipal level. But that is not the case. In 2001 the relative share of the popula-
tion attending the assemblies was higher at the state level (3.71 per cent)31 than it has 
ever been in Porto Alegre (the highest was 1.27 per cent in 2002).32 The state participa-
tory budget in 2011-2014, had lower assembly attendance than either of these two cases 
                                                
30 Interview with “Thais”, delegate in the state participatory budget in Canoas, 10.04.2014 
31 Source: Goldfrank and Schneider (2002) 
32 Fedozzi et al. (2013) 
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(0.77 per cent). This is most likely caused by the fact the voting on the budget priorities 
was removed from the meetings and instead organized as a state-wide referendum. In 
2014 approximately 1.3 million adults voted in this referendum, which makes up 11.7 
per cent of the population.33 
     But who are these participants? Gret and Sintomer (2005) argue that the local scale 
of the Porto Alegre’s participatory budget has made it possible for hitherto excluded 
groups to become involved in local politics. Thus, they also predict that the profile of 
the participants will be different in participatory processes at higher levels of govern-
ment, since the issues at stake there will be more complex and detached from the every-
day realities of the population. But here they seem to be wrong. A survey made of the 
participants at the state level in 1999-2002, shows that the majority had the same char-
acteristic profile as in Porto Alegre; they were mostly women with low education and 
low incomes (César 2004; Coradini 2009). In other words, the enlarged scale of the pro-
cess did not lead to elite-domination. 
 
Table 1: Share of delegates with low education (up to primary education).  
 
  2000(c)/2001(a) 2009(d)/2014(b) 
Delegates in the state participatory budget (from 
the Metropolitan Region of Porto Alegre) 
46.4 % 19.8 % 
Delegates in the municipal participatory budget-
ing in Porto Alegre 
39 % 40.4 % 
 
Note: Based on closest possible comparison of delegates in time. The Metropolitan region of Porto Ale-
gre consists of Porto Alegre and surrounding municipalities. However, most of the delegates in the met-
ropolitan region are from Porto Alegre.  
Sources: a) Faria (2005, 193) b) survey of delegates at state level in 2014, conducted by the author c) 
Baiocchi (2005, 15) d) survey of delegates at the municipal level in Porto Alegre in 2009, conducted by 
Observatório da Cidade de Porto Alegre. 
 
Unfortunately, we don’t have data on the profile of regular participants in the state par-
ticipatory budget from 2011-2014, but we do for the delegates. Delegates have always 
come from slightly more privileged sectors than the average participants (Fedozzi and 
Martins 2015; César 2004), so the interesting comparison here is not whether the dele-
gates are different from assembly participants but whether they differ from each other at 
                                                
33 Sources for 2011-2014: http://www1.seplag.rs.gov.br/upload/Mensagem.pdf (last accessed 
01.04.2016) 
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the different levels. As shown in table 1 nearly half of the delegates at the state level 
(46.4 per cent) came from lower-educated sectors of the population in the early 2000s, 
whereas this was the case of 39 per cent in Porto Alegre. Around the time of the second 
state participatory budget their profiles were very different. The share of delegates with 
low education was still high in Porto Alegre (40 per cent), but it was only 19.8 per cent 
among state delegates.  
      This table shows that the profile of delegates (and most probably therefore the sec-
tors taking part in the process) is not dependent on the scale, but rather on other factors. 
The most probable explanation for the gap that has developed in recent years is that 
social movements, unions and neighborhood associations do not involve themselves in 
the state participatory process and therefore do not mobilize the low-income sectors to 
participate anymore. The community connected delegate has become the minority. As a 
study of state participatory budgeting in both the early 2000s and in recent years read: 
“[In] the original experiences participating citizens came mainly from what me might 
call civil society: people who came on their own, who became mobilized by neighbor-
hood initiatives, or were participants in social movements, trade unions or other civil 
organisations. […] [Now] more than half of the participants in public meetings of the 
participatory budgeting process are public servants” (Sobottka and Streck 2014, 169). 
My survey confirms this picture. Most delegates in 2014 were employed by the gov-
ernment. 67 per cent said that they represented a municipality, a state organ or a hospi-
tal, school or university, and only 18 per cent represented a civil society association, 
NGO, social movement, popular council or trade union. In comparison, the survey from 
2001 shows 54 per cent of the state delegates in the metropolitan region at that time 
participated in a neighborhood association, 14.5 per cent in a trade union, 14.7 per cent 
in a popular council, and 9 per cent in an NGO (Faria 2005, 177). 
 
Comprehensibility, bureaucratic administration and popular control 
One of the reasons that participatory democracy is assumed to work better at the city 
level, is that the context is more comprehensible for ordinary citizens. Gret and Sintom-
er (2005) argue that higher scales will require more socio-economic resources of the 
participants, because it is more difficult to understand the complexity of the process 
when it encompasses more people. One indicator of such comprehension could be the 
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familiarity the participants have with the rules that guide the process. Again, what I 
have done is a comparison of the delegates’ familiarity and not ordinary participants. 
But if their hypothesis is right we should probably see the same pattern among delegates 
as well, since this group would also struggle with more complexity at larger scales. 
 
Table 2: Linear probability model: degree of familiarity with the rules and regulations 
of the participatory budget process (few or none vs. most or some) among delegates 
in Porto Alegre 2009 and Rio Grande do Sul 2014. 
 
  Municipal delegates State delegates T-test comparison  
Gender       
Women (reference group)       
Men -0.17 (0.07)* 0.17 (0.04)** -3.93 
Age       
Less than 26 years (refer-
ence group) 
      
26-41 years 0.28 (0.21) -0.06 (0.08) 1.51 
42-60 years 0.33 (0.20) 0.10 (0.07) 1.05 
More than 60 years 0.43 (0.03) † 0.11 (0.09) 1.29 
Education       
No complete formal edu-
cation (reference group) 
      
Primary education 0.11 (0.12) 0.09 (0.11) 0.09 
Secondary education 0.39 (0.10)** 0.20 (0.10)* 1.31 
Higher education 0.48 (0.13)** 0.34 (0.10)** 0.89 
Employment situation       
Precarious employment 
or out of work (reference 
group) 
      
Stable employment 0.05 (0.08)† 0.12 (0.06)* -0.68 
Constant 0.11 (0.22) 0.12 (0.12)   
F-statistic 4.23** 7.16**  
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.08  
N 146 557   
Note: The coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in paren-
thesis. Significance levels: **p<0,01; *p<0,05; †p<0,10. The t-test of the regression coefficients 
in the two models shows that they are not significantly different from each other at the munici-
pal and state level. Following Mood (2010) I have opted for a linear probability model even 
though the dependent variable is dichotomous. This is because logistic regression is vulnerable 
to unobserved heterogeneity and cannot be compared across samples. However, I have run a 
logistic regression as a robustness check, and both methods give similar results. 




As the linear probability model in table 2 shows there is a correlation between educa-
tional resources and the economic resources that come from being in a stable employ-
ment situation at both levels. The correlation between the length of the education and 
familiarity of rules, however, is not stronger at the state level. This contradicts the pre-
diction made by Gret and Sintomer. The probability that delegates with secondary edu-
cation as compared to delegates with no complete formal education will understand the 
rules of the process is higher at the municipal (0.39) than at the state level (0.20). The 
probability that delegates with higher education will know them as opposed to those 
with no education is also higher at the municipal (0.48) than the state level (0.34). The 
difference between these coefficients, however, is not statistically significant. We can-
not conclude that the process is more difficult to understand at the city level for people 
with lower education. This finding is somewhat surprising, but it’s probably due to the 
fact that the participatory budget is a quite complex process in Porto Alegre. Neverthe-
less, this finding at least disturbs the notion that it is much easier to understand the 
workings of urban rather than state affairs. 
      Another assumption made is that as the complexity of issues increases at higher 
scales, experts and bureaucratic organizations will be more dominant in the decision-
making processes. The participatory budget in Rio Grande do Sul exhibits an ongoing 
tension between the regular participants and staff in the state departments. Participants 
complain about the little degree of freedom they have in choosing the investments that 
they really want, whereas employees in the bureaucracy complain about the shortsight-
edness and ignorance of long-term planning, service delivery and infrastructure devel-
opment among participants. There have been attempts to alleviate this tension. The or-
ganizers try, for example, to have officials from relevant state departments present at 
public assemblies to answer questions from the public as well as to provide information 
on the realism of different local demands. But the outcome of this has been ambiguous. 
On the one hand it has probably helped reduce the distance between the state admin-
istration and the population. On the other hand, it seems to have had the unintended 
consequence that these bureaucrats involve themselves in the process and try to con-
vince participants to vote in favor of the demands of their sector.  
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Faria (2005) argues that state bureaucracies are larger and also more autonomous than at 
the local scale, and that this gives them more power vis-à-vis citizens in Rio Grande do 
Sul than in Porto Alegre. But this is also prevalent at the city level. As Rebecca Abers 
writes, the government in Porto Alegre “publicly declared that all budget decisions were 
‘approved by the [elected council in the budget process].’ But in practice, it had signifi-
cant influence over the results of many of the council's decisions. Not only did the ad-
ministration have a monopoly on information about government practices, but also gov-
ernment staff included highly skilled professionals who were nearly always capable of 
formulating convincing arguments” (Abers 2000, 200). 
      It is difficult to measure whether this tension favors more the bureaucracy or the 
participants at the state and the municipal level, but if we are to judge based on the del-
egates’ own perception of their influence they are more positive in Porto Alegre than at 
the state level. When asked about their influence to establish the rules and guidelines 
that regulate the process, almost 50 per cent of the delegates in Porto Alegre said that 
they always have this authority whereas 30 per cent of the delegates in Rio Grande do 
Sul thought the same. When asked to evaluate their authority to monitor the implemen-
tation of projects selected through participatory budgeting, 71 per cent of the delegates 
in Porto Alegre said that they always had such authority compared to 53 per cent of the 
delegates in Rio Grande do Sul.34 
 
Is Barber’s hope warranted? 
Barber writes that participatory budgeting offers hope for those who believe there may 
be a little less distance between mayors and citizens than between voters and state au-
thorities. This study only partly warrants this hope. Participatory budgeting may remain 
closer to the ideals of participatory democracy when it occurs at the city level, but this 
does not imply that participatory democracy is impossible at larger scales. The state 
participatory budget has limitations: the space for deliberation among participants is 
narrow, the process is more representative than direct, and the state bureaucracy tries to 
                                                
34 Thanks to Brian Wampler for giving me access to the survey he did of a random selection of 
around half the delegates in Porto Alegre in 2003. Beware that the delegates’ perception of their 
own authority may not only vary with scale, but also time. It is not unproblematic to compare a 
survey done in 2003 and in 2014.  
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influence the outcome. This description is also valid for Porto Alegre, but to a lesser 
degree. 
      Does this mean that Low is right in that there is nothing special about the city? I 
think this conclusion would also be wrong. One of the key characteristics of democratic 
participation has been the existence community-based associations that have mobilized 
participants form low income sectors and introduced new relations between delegates 
and participants into the budget process. For a time this was recreated in the state partic-
ipatory budget, and when these associations stopped mobilizing at the state level, the 
process became dominated by public officials and participants from more privileged 
backgrounds.  
      As Barber writes, participatory budgeting in Brazil is just one of many cases that 
cannot by themselves prove or disprove the proposition that the city is the most appro-
priate scale for participatory democracy. This picture would also be different if we 
broadened our scope to examine the space for participatory processes at the nation-state 
level – the realm of ‘big politics’; of monetary and foreign policy and of law-making. 
Nevertheless, the experiences of participatory budgeting in Brazil suggest that it is both 
wrong to overemphasize the uniqueness of the city and to undervalue the special role 
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